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I. INTRODUCTION
On September 5, 2019, by rejecting the application of a strict primary purpose
test that would have limited the Coeur d’Alene tribe’s water rights, the Idaho
Supreme Court rendered a major decision in the field of Indian water rights.1
The Coeur d’Alene case was a matter of first impression for the Idaho Supreme
Court. Indeed, even if the Idaho Supreme Court has “extensive experience resolving
water law matters, including decisions on federal reserved water right claims in the
Snake River Basin Adjudication,” the Idaho Supreme Court never had the occasion
“to expressly determine whether and to what degree a tribe is entitled to reserved
water rights.”2

1. In re CSRBA Case No. 49576 Subcase No. 91-7755, 448 P.3d 322, 165 Idaho 517 (2019).
2. Duane T. Mecham, The Winters Reserved Water Rights Doctrine in the 21st Century: Further
Definition Through Litigation, ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST, 65th Annual Proceedings (2019).
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Should the homeland purpose theory be used when a court is assessing the
reserved water rights of federal Indian reservations? Or should the primary purpose
test–that, according to the United States Supreme Court, applies to federal nonIndian reservations–be also applied to federal Indian reservations? This issue has
not been decided by the United States Supreme Court yet.
First, this paper will focus on the state of law prior to the Coeur d’Alene
decision and will explain the distinction between the homeland purpose theory and
the controlling case law's rule of “primary-secondary” distinction. Then, this paper
will take a close look at the Coeur d’Alene decision itself. Finally, this paper will
explain why the homeland standard makes sense in the context of Indian
reservations.
II. BACKGROUND
Between 1908 and 1978, the United States Supreme Court articulated the
“federal implied reserved water rights doctrine” in several decisions.3 According to
this doctrine4, “when the United States ‘withdraws its land from the public domain
and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves
appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the
purpose of the reservation.’”5
Unlike state water rights, which historically required a diversion of
water from a stream, and which today usually require state sanction of
some sort, federal reserved rights are not dependent on state approval.
3. Jeffrey C. Fereday & Christopher H. Meyer, What Is the Federal Reserved Water Rights
Doctrine, Really? Answering This Question in Idaho’s Snake River Basin Adjudication, 52 IDAHO L. REV. 341,
343 (2019) (quoting United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978) (interpreting the 1899 federal
land withdrawal for the Gila National Forest); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976)
(interpreting the 1952 Proclamation by President Truman that created the Devil’s Hole National
Monument); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (holding that
the 1952 McCarran Amendment provided consent to determine in state courts federal reserved water
rights held on behalf of Indian tribes); United States v. Eagle Cty., 401 U.S. 520 (1971) (interpreting a
1905 withdrawal of land to create the White River National Forest); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546
(1963) (interpreting several treaties that created Indian reservations in Arizona, California, and Nevada,
all of which predated 1929, along with several federal land withdrawals for National Recreation Areas,
National Wildlife Refuges and National Forests, all of which predated 1955); Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Oregon, 349 U.S. 435 (1955) (holding that the 1877 Desert Land Act provision making water on public
land subject to private appropriation under state law was inapplicable to federal lands reserved for
hydroelectric projects); United States v. Powers, 305 U.S. 527 (1939) (interpreting an 1868 treaty setting
aside a tract of land for the Crow Indians in what is now Montana); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S.
564 (1908) (interpreting the 1888 treaty creating the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation)).
4. In this paper, we will refer to it as “the Winters doctrine.”
5. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1268
(9th Cir. 2017) (citing Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138 (1976); Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564, 575–78 (1908); and Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 46 (9th Cir. 1981)).
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Instead, they spring from federal decisions to reserve federal land for
specific purposes, such as national forests, parks, wildlife refuges, and
wilderness areas, as well as Indian reservations.6
But what does the “purpose” of the reservation exactly mean? And what kind
of test should we be using to determine this “purpose”?
A. The Winters Case
In May of 1888, the government reserved a tract of land and created the Fort
Belknap Reservation.7 Neither the agreement with the Indians, nor the act of
Congress, ratifying that agreement, mentioned any kind of reservation of the
waters of the Milk River and its tributaries for use on the reservation.8 Later in time,
a few individuals acquired some land under the desert land laws of the United
States: “[s]ome of them had appropriated different quantities of water from the
West Fork of Milk river, and others from the North Fork of Milk river, and all claim
that at the time the waters were appropriated and diverted by them the lands along
the bank of said stream above the point of said diversions were unappropriated
public lands. Large amounts of money exceeding $100,000, had been expended by
them in diverting the water and in making other improvements on their lands.”9
According to these landowners, the reservation was not entitled to any water
because the agreement with the Indians and the act of Congress did not expressly
reserve any water rights.10 The Court disagreed.11
Indeed, the Court stated that Congress created the reservation for the
purpose of converting the tribe to an agrarian lifestyle.12 Because the reservation
in question would have little value without irrigation, Congress must have intended
to reserve water rights for the tribe so that it could develop the reservation land for
livable and productive agrarian use.13 Therefore, the tribe was entitled to a
sufficient amount of water to fulfill the reservation’s purpose, as evidenced by
Congressional creation of the reservation.14 The logic behind the Court’s reasoning
was the fact that the agreement between the Indians and the government was a
6. Michael C. Blumm, Reversing the Winters Doctrine?: Denying Reserved Water Rights for
Idaho Wilderness and Its Implications, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 173, 174 (2005).
7. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 575 (1908).
8. Id. at 573.
9. Winters v. United States, 143 F. 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1906).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 576.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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grant of rights from the Indians and not to the Indians.15 Therefore, it was
impossible to think that the Indians would have given up the water rights necessary
to their own survival.16 The Court applied the canon of construction under which
ambiguities are resolved to the detriment of the drafters and therefore here in
favor of the Indians.17 The Court ruled that the creation of an Indian reservation
implies the reservation of water: “The power of the Government to reserve the
waters and exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not, and could
not be. That the Government did reserve them we have decided, and for a use
which would be necessarily continued through years.”18 The take-away of the
Winters case is the fact that the power of the federal government to reserve the
waters for use by an Indian reservation and exempt them from appropriation under
the state laws cannot be denied.
B. The New Mexico Case
Seventy years after the Winters case, the United States Supreme Court
considered reserved right claims for a national forest.19 The Court established its
now famous “primary-secondary purpose” distinction, holding that water is
impliedly reserved for a reservation’s “primary” purposes; it is not, however,
reserved for its secondary purposes.20
Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal
reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in the face
of Congress' express deference to state water law in other areas, that
the United States intended to reserve the necessary water. Where
water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, however,
there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended, consistent
with its other views, that the United States would acquire water in the
same manner as any other public or private appropriator.21
Because a national forest is a non-Indian federal reservation, one can wonder
whether or not the Court's “primary-secondary purpose” test should be applied
to Indian reservations as well. This question has not been decided by the United
States Supreme Court yet. And the Idaho Supreme Court addresses this issue for
the first time in Idaho in the Coeur d’Alene case.

15. Winters, 207 U.S. at 578.
16. See id.
17. Winters, 207 U.S. at 576–77.
18. Id. at 577 (citing United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 702 (1899);
United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905)).
19. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978).
20. Id. at 702.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
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III. PRIOR TO THE COEUR D’ALENE DECISION
Without any current ruling by the United States Supreme Court, courts are
applying two different theories when assessing the reserved water rights of federal
Indian reservations.22 On one side, there is the rule of “primary-secondary”
distinction (the “narrow view”) that is currently the controlling case law, applied by
the Ninth Circuit of Appeals at the federal level and by the Wyoming Supreme Court
at the state level.23 On the other side, there is the homeland purpose theory (or
“broader view”) followed by the Supreme Court of Arizona and the Supreme Court
of Montana.24
A. The “Broader View”: The Homeland Purpose Theory
“The concept of a reservation as a homeland is not new.”25 As explained by
Professor Cosens,
Tribes have long asserted a homeland purpose in quantification of
water rights. Courts have either rejected the approach: Big Horn I at 9497, rejecting the finding of the Special Master that treaty language
stating “[t]he Indian herein named agree . . . they will make said
reservations their permanent home,” indicated that a primary purpose
of the Reservation was to provide a permanent homeland, or relied on
quantification for irrigation to provide sufficient water to account for
future needs implicit in a homeland purpose: Colville Confederated
Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47-48 (9th Cir. 1981) holding that “one
purpose for creating this reservation was to provide a homeland for the
Indians to maintain their agrarian society” and then concluding that the

22. See, e.g. State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754 (1985),
see also In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68
(2001); In re the Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System and All Other
Sources, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988).
23. See, e.g. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River System
and All Other Sources, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988).
24. See, e.g. State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754 (1985),
see also In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68
(2001).
25. Barbara Cosens, The Legacy of Winters v. United States and the Winters Doctrine, One
Hundred Year Later 9 (Sept. 17–20, 2008) (unpublished article presented to the American Bar
Association, Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources, 16th Section Fall Meeting in Phoenix, AZ).
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amount of water necessary to irrigate all practicably irrigable acreage is
the appropriate measure of water for that purpose).26
In 1985, the Montana Supreme Court held that Indian reservations, and their
reserved rights, differ from other reservations and their reserved rights.27 One of
the main differences that the court emphasizes is the fact that “[f]ederal reserved
water rights are created by the document that reserves the land from the public
domain. By contrast, aboriginal-Indian reserved water rights exist from time
immemorial and are merely recognized by the document that reserves the Indian
land. Federal reserved water rights, on the other hand, are created by and cannot
predate the document that reserved the federal land from the public domain.”28
The Montana Supreme Court recognizes multiple purposes including aboriginal
rights not established by Congress but retained by the tribe. This interpretation,
while not directly addressing the issue of a homeland purpose, suggests that the
primary purpose test should be inapplicable to Indian reservations.
In 2001, the Arizona Supreme Court expressly declined to apply the primary
purpose test in the Gila River adjudication.29 The Court clearly stated that “while
the purpose for which the federal government reserves other types of lands may
be strictly construed, the purposes of Indian reservations are necessarily entitled to
broader interpretation if the goal of Indian self-sufficiency is to be attained.”30
According to Professor Cosens,
The Arizona Supreme Court is the first state court to squarely adopt a
homeland standard [at the time] and to further articulate a method of
quantification consistent with that standard by indicating” is specific to
the needs, wants, plans, cultural background, and geographic setting of
the particular reservation, and cannot be defined by a single measure
such as PIA. In reaching its decision, the Arizona Supreme Court
distinguished Indian reservations from other federal reservations on
the basis of the canons of construction requiring liberal interpretation
of treaties, statutes, and executive orders pertaining to Indian affairs,
and the federal fiduciary relationship with tribes. [emphasis added]31

26. Id. at 16 n.80.
27. State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754, 766 (1985).
28. Id. at 767.
29. Id. at 754.
30. In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68,
77 (2001).
31. Barbara Cosens, The Legacy of Winters v. United States and the Winters Doctrine, One
Hundred Year Later 9.
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B. The “Narrow View”: The Controlling Case Law's Rule of “PrimarySecondary” Distinction
i. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Approach
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has applied the primary purpose test to the
Colville and Agua Caliente reservations.32
In 1981, in the famous Colville Confederated Tribes case, the Ninth Circuit
cited New Mexico and explained that the Supreme Court had applied the primary
purpose test to determine “the extent of an implied reservation of water for a
national forest.”33 By clearly identifying that New Mexico was assessing the water
rights related to a national forest (and therefore non-Indian federal reserved
rights), there is no doubt that the Ninth Circuit could have distinguished New
Mexico and held that the primary purpose test was not applicable to Indian
reservations. However, the Ninth Circuit did not follow this path.34 Instead, the
Court clearly mentioned: “[w]e apply the New Mexico test here.”35
Thirty-six years later the Ninth Circuit reiterated its analysis. In the Agua
Caliente case, the Ninth Circuit expressly stated:
We have previously noted that New Mexico is “not directly applicable
to Winters doctrine rights on Indian reservations.” United States v.
Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1408 (9th Cir. 1983). However, it clearly
“establish[es] several useful guidelines.” Id. 36
Once again, instead of distinguishing New Mexico, the Ninth Circuit applied
the New Mexico test to the Agua Caliente Indian reservation.37
Each time though, the court found that the primary purpose was to provide a
homeland for the tribes. In Colville, the court stated that, “[t]he general purpose,
to provide a home for the Indians, is a broad one and must be liberally construed.”38
The Court reached this conclusion after considering “the document and
circumstances surrounding [the reservation’s] creation,” and “the history of the

32. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47, 49 cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981),
modified, 752 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1010 (1986); Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla
Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d 1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2017).
33. Colville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d at 47 (emphasis added).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1269 n.6. (emphasis added).
37. Id.
38. Colville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d at 47.
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Indians for whom it was created”.39 In Agua Caliente, the court held that “the
primary purpose underlying the establishment of the reservation was to create a
home for the Tribe, and water was necessarily implicated in that purpose.”40 Once
again, the court reached this conclusion after considering “the document and
circumstances surrounding [the reservation's] creation, and the history of the
Indians for whom it was created.”41
ii. The Supreme Court of Wyoming Approach
In Big Horn I, the Supreme Court of Wyoming expressly rejected the homeland
standard.42 According to Special Master Roncalio, the principle purpose of the
treaty was “to provide the Indians with a homeland where they could establish a
permanent place to live and to develop their civilization just as any other nation
throughout history has been able to develop its civilization.”43 However, the district
court did not follow the Special Master view.44 And the majority of the Supreme
Court of Wyoming followed the district court judge: “Considering the wellestablished principles of treaty interpretation, the treaty itself, the ample evidence
and testimony addressed, and the findings of the district court,” explained the
majority, “we have no difficulty affirming the finding that it was the intent at the
time to create a reservation with a sole agricultural purpose.”45
In contrast, dissenting Justice Thomas stated that,
[t]he purpose of establishing an Indian reservation, such as the Wind
River Indian Reservation, is to provide a homeland for Indian peoples.
If one is to assume that, pursuant to the reserved rights doctrine
relating to water, there is an implied reservation of those waters
essential to accomplish the purpose of the reservation of land, then I
cannot agree that the implied reservation of water with respect to the
Wind River Indian Reservation should be limited, as the majority has
held in approving the judgment of the district court.46
Similarly, dissenting Judge Hanscum would have held that “the implied
reservation of water rights attaching to an Indian reservation should assume any
use that is appropriate to the Indian homeland as it progresses and develops.”47

39. Id.
40. Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1270.
41. Id. (citing Colville Confederated Tribes, 647 F.2d at 47).
42. In re the General Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Big Horn River Sys., 753 P.2d
76, 94 (Wyo. 1988) [hereinafter Big Horn I].
43. Id. at 94.
44. Id. at 95 (“On the very face of the Treaty, it is clear that its purpose was purely agricultural.”).
45. Id. at 96.
46. Id. at 119 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 135 (Hanscum, J. dissenting).
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In the Coeur d’Alene case, the trial court in the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River
Basin Adjudication (CSRBA) strictly applied the primary purpose test, rejecting any
general or permanent homeland purpose that could warrant additional water
rights.48
In order to determine the claims to which the Tribe was entitled, the
district court first determined reserved water rights could be implicitly
reserved for only the primary purposes of the Reservation. The district
court found that agriculture, fishing and hunting, and domestic
purposes were the primary purposes of the Reservation, and therefore
limited the Tribe's claims to those purposes. The district court further
found in its summary judgment order that the Tribe was not entitled to
the following water rights claims: claims based on a homeland purpose
theory; claims based on secondary purposes (including industrial,
commercial, aesthetics, recreation, and others); claims outside of the
boundaries of the Reservation; and the claim for lake level maintenance
of Lake Coeur d’Alene.49
It is interesting to note that neither the Ninth Circuit decisions nor the
decisions rendered by the Montana and the Arizona Supreme Courts were analyzed
by the trial court, despite the fact that all of these decisions had ruled specifically
on this issue.50
IV. THE COEUR D’ALENE DECISION
A. Background
In 2008, Idaho commenced the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin
Adjudication (CSRBA) in northern Idaho where the Coeur d’Alene Reservation is
located.51 “The CSRBA is a ‘comprehensive determination of the nature, extent, and
priority of’ all surface and ground water rights in the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River

48. In re CSRBA Case No. 49576 Subcase No. 91-7755, 448 P.3d 322, 333, 165 Idaho 517, 528
(2019).
49. Id.
50. Mecham, supra note 2.
51. See Commencement Order for the Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin General Adjudication,
In re: The Gen. Adjustication of Rights to the Use of Water From the Coeur D’Alene-Spokane River Basin
Water

System

(Idaho

5th

Jud.

Dist.

Nov.

12,

2008)

https://idwr.idaho.gov/files/adjudication/20081112-csrba-commencement-order.pdf
Commencement Order], at 1.

(No.

49576),
[hereinafter
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Basin water system in Idaho.”52 Pursuant to Idaho Code section 42-1406B, the
Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources filed a petition with the
district court to initiate the CSRBA; the district court granted the petition and
initiated the general adjudication on November 12, 2008.53
On March 26, 2014, the United States filed in the CSRBA 353 claims as trustee
on behalf of the Tribe for water rights associated with the reservation.54
These claims were premised on the federal government's assessment
that the Coeur d’Alene Reservation required all water reasonably
necessary to provide a permanent homeland for the Tribe, including
instream flows to protect fisheries (fishing purpose), wildlife and native
plant habitat (hunting and gathering purpose), minimum lake levels
(hunting, fishing, gathering, recreation, and cultural and spiritual uses),
current and future irrigation, and domestic, municipal, commercial, and
industrial water needs.55
The Tribe was granted intervention.56 Initially, consideration of the Tribe’s
claims proceeded on dual litigation and negotiation tracks, but when negotiations
hit an impasse, the parties proceeded to litigate the claims, bifurcating the case into
two phases: entitlement and then quantification.57 Under the CSRBA process, the
State and several local parties filed objections to the tribal entitlement to reserved
water.58 After hearing arguments on summary judgment motions, which focused
primarily on the issue of the purposes for which the reservation was established as
the basis for the Tribe’s entitlement to reserved water rights, CSRBA Presiding
Judge Eric J. Wildman issued a ruling on May 3, 2017.59
Basically, the main arguments can be summarized as follows. The United
States and the Tribe argued that New Mexico does not apply to Indian reservations,
“because the reservation being considered in New Mexico was a national forest, it
is distinguishable. . . .”60 On the contrary, the State of Idaho argued that “New
Mexico's primary-secondary analysis applies to Indian reservations because it is
52. In re CSRBA Case No. 49576 Subcase No. 91-7755, 448 P.3d at 330 n.1, 165 Idaho at 525 n.1.
53. Commencement Order, supra note 5, at 4–6.
54. 448 P.3d at 330, 165 Idaho at 525.
55. Brief of Appellant United States, In re CSRBA Case No. 49576 Subcase No. 91-7755, 448 P.3d
322, 165 Idaho 517 (2018) (No. 45382-2017), 2018 WL 1762783.
56. In re CSRBA Case No. 49576 Subcase No. 91-7755, 448 P.3d at 330, 165 Idaho at 525.
57. Order on Motions for Summary Judgment at 1, In re CSRBA Case No. 49576 Subcase No. 917755, No. 49576 (Idaho 5th Jud. Dist. May 3, 2017) [hereinafter CSRBA Order] (explaining that the trial
court on February 17, 2015, bifurcated the "matter between issues of entitlement and quantification,
with the issue of entitlement to be addressed first"), http://www.srba.state.id.us/Images/201705/9107755xx01037.pdf.

For

documents

relating

to

the

negotiation

track,

http://www.srba.state.id.us/CSRBA10.HTM.
58. CSRBA Order, supra note 57, at 1–3.
59. CSRBA Order, supra note 57, at 20.
60. In re CSRBA Case No. 49576 Subcase No. 91-7755, 448 P.3d at 342, 165 Idaho at 537.

see
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derived from United States Supreme Court decisions addressing reservations,
which included Indian reservations.”61
B. The Trial Court Decision
The trial court applies the New Mexico primary purposes test: “[a]s a matter
of law, the scope and nature of claims the United States may seek under the
reserved rights doctrine is defined by the primary purposes of the reservation.”62
First of all, the court rejects the federal and tribal positions that the primary
purpose of the reservation was to provide a “permanent homeland” for the Tribe.63
Then, the court holds that the homeland theory “eliminates the primary-secondary
purposes distinction set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court by proposing that all water
use associated with an Indian reservation serves the primary purpose of that
reservation.”64 Additionally, the court notes that the United States Supreme Court
“has never adopted or applied a homeland theory primary purpose.”65 For all of
these reasons, the court declines to apply the homeland theory.66
Having rejected the homeland theory, the trial court then based its review of
the asserted claims on its reading of the relevant historical documentation. The
court found that the primary purposes for which water was reserved were “to
promote an agrarian lifestyle for its inhabitants,”67 “to provide the Tribe with
waterways for fishing and hunting,”68 and, “water rights for domestic use.”69
Therefore, the district court specifically allowed reserved water rights for
agriculture, fishing, hunting, and domestic purposes.70
C. The Idaho Supreme Court Decision
Justice Stegner of the Idaho Supreme Court (writing for the majority) begins
its analysis by mentioning the Winters doctrine, stating that “[i]ntent to reserve

61. Id.
62. CSRBA Order, supra note 58, at 8.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 10.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 10–11.
67. Id. at 11.
68. Id. at 12.
69. Id. at 13–14.
70. Id. at 11–14.
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water is inferred if the waters are necessary to accomplish the reservation's
purposes.”71
Then, the court lists a number of criteria that need to be taken into
consideration in order to assess the purposes of a reservation. First, the
reservation’s purposes are determined at the time surrounding the reservation’s
creation.72 Second, “[r]eservation purposes are derived from ‘the document[s] and
circumstances surrounding [a reservation's] creation, and the history of the Indians
for whom it was created.’”73 Third, the Court reiterates the principle under which
Indian rights cannot be abrogated by Congress without “clear intent and an express
agreement from the Indians.”74
The Court relies on the Greely decision rendered by the Montana Supreme
Court in 1985 and the Gila decision rendered by the Arizona Supreme Court in
2001.75 In both of these decisions, the Supreme Courts have decided that the New
Mexico's primary-secondary analysis was not applicable to Indian reservations.76
The Supreme Court of Montana held that Indian and non-Indian
reservations are to be distinguished from one another. That court held
that Indian reservations, and their reserved water rights, differ from
other reservations and their reserved water rights in at least two
important ways. First, the two rights have different origins. Non-Indian
“federal reserved water rights are created by the document that
reserves the land from the public domain. By contrast, aboriginal-Indian
reserved water rights exist from time immemorial and are merely
recognized by the document that reserves the Indian land.” Second,
Montana found ownership to be an important distinction. “The United
States is not the owner of Indian reserved rights; it is a trustee for the
benefit of the” tribes. In contrast, the United States owns federal
reserved rights in all other reservations and has the power to “lease,
sell, quitclaim, release, encumber or convey its own federal reserved
water rights.” Bearing these distinctions in mind, the Montana court
held that Indian rights “are given broader interpretation in order to
further the federal goal of Indian self-sufficiency.”77

71. In re CSRBA Case No. 49576 Subcase No. 91-7755, 448 P.3d 322, 335, 165 Idaho 517, 530
(2019).
72. Id.
73. Id. (quoting Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d
1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2017)).
74. Id. at 536 (quoting Pocatello v. State, 180 P.3d 1048, 1057, 145 Idaho 497, 506 (2008)).
75. State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754 (Mont. 1985); In
re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68 (2001).
76. Id. at 343, 165 Idaho at 538.
77. Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 712 P.2d 754, 767–68 (Mont. 1985)).
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The court also relies on the Winters decision itself: “Language in Winters
suggests a homeland purpose theory may arise in certain reservations. In Winters,
the Supreme Court lent support to the idea that the reservation at issue was
established as a ‘home and abiding place of the Indians.’”78
The Idaho Supreme Court indicates that it “has also previously noted a
distinction between non-Indian reservations and Indian reservations.”79
Then, the Court holds that, because of all of the above considerations, a
broader purpose—the homeland purpose—is “more consistent with both Supreme
Court precedent and the well-established canons of construction regarding Indian
reservations.”80
Finally, the Court overturned the trial court and ruled that the Tribe’s claims
should be analyzed from the perspective of what the Tribe needed to establish a
homeland on the reservation.81 Basing its analysis on the formative documents and
historical context surrounding the Reservation’s creation, the court found that the
homeland purpose for this reservation covers the following uses: domestic,
agriculture, hunting and fishing, plant gathering, and cultural uses.82 The court held
that the Tribe’s reserved rights included groundwater as well as instream flows on
the reservation.83 The court declined to find a reserved right for industrial and
commercial uses of water, off-reservation instream flows, or lake level
maintenance for Lake Coeur d’Alene.84
In a nutshell, the Court held that the district court improperly applied the
controlling case law's rule of “primary-secondary” distinction and instead should
have allowed aboriginal purposes of plant gathering and cultural uses under the
homeland purpose theory.85 The court found that “[t]he reasons given by the
Montana and Arizona courts are persuasive as to why the purposes of Indian
reservations should not be construed similarly to non-Indian federal

78. In re CSRBA Case No. 49576 Subcase No. 91-7755, 448 P.3d at 344, 165 Idaho at 539 (quoting
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 565 (1908)).
79. Id. (citing Potlatch Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1264, 134 Idaho 916, 920 (2000))
(“Winters dealt with the creation of a reservation by treaty, a bargained for exchange between two
entities. . . . To the contrary, the Wilderness Act is not an exchange; it is an act of Congress that sets
aside land, immunizing it from further development. There is no principle of construction requiring the
Court to interpret the Wilderness Act to create an implied water right. The opposite inference should
apply.”).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 342–46, 165 Idaho at 537–41.
82. Id. at 348–50, 165 Idaho at 543–45.
83. Id. at 355, 165 Idaho at 550.
84. State, 448 P.3d at 350–51, 359, 165 Idaho at 545–46, 554.
85. State, 448 P.3d at 362, 165 Idaho at 557.
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reservations.”86 “Even more to the point,” the court continued, “the primarysecondary distinction runs counter to the concept that the purpose of many Indian
reservations was to establish a ‘home and abiding place’ for the tribes.”87
V. ANALYSIS
The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that when determining the purposes for
which Coeur d’Alene reservation had been established, “the homeland purpose
theory is better suited to an Indian reservation.”88 The court found persuasive the
treatment of the issues by the Arizona and Montana Supreme Courts, which “have
found New Mexico's primary-secondary analysis inapplicable to Indian water rights
cases.”89
The decision was correct. Because of the fundamental distinction between a
federal non-Indian reservation and an Indian reservation, and also because of the
inherent purpose of an Indian reservation, the homeland standard should be
applied when dealing with Indian reservations.
A. The Fundamental Distinction Between a Federal Reservation and
an Indian Reservation
As explained above, the Montana Supreme Court and the Arizona Supreme
Court distinguished Indian reservations and federal reservations while assessing
whether or not the New Mexico primary-purpose analysis should be applied to
Indian reservations.
Nineteen years before the Coeur d’Alene decision, the Idaho Supreme Court
had already made a clear distinction between federal reserved water rights for
Indian reservations and federal reserved water rights for non-Indian federal
reservations.90 Indeed, in Potlatch (the Schroeder opinion), the Court noted that
Indian reservations are created through a “bargained for exchange” between two
sovereign entities, while non-Indian reservations are not.91
Little about the background and principles of Winters is applicable in
this case. Winters dealt with the creation of a reservation by treaty, a
bargained for exchange between two entities. Without the use of
water, the purpose of the agreement between the United States and
the tribes would be defeated. The land retained by the tribes would not
be fit for habitation. In contract terms there would be no consideration
for the agreement if the tribes gave up land and did not receive the
benefit of water to make the land they retained habitable. To the

86. Id. at 344, 165 Idaho at 539.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Potlach Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260, 1264, 134 Idaho 916 (2000).
91. Id. at 920 (2000).
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contrary, the Wilderness Act is not an exchange; it is an act of Congress
that sets aside land, immunizing it from further development. There is
no principle of construction requiring the Court to interpret the
Wilderness Act to create an implied water right. The opposite inference
should apply. Congress could define the scope of any water right as it
chose. Congress did not define a water right as a specific purpose of the
Wilderness Act. “The Supreme Court has held that in cases such as this,
where water is not necessary to fulfill the specific purposes of a
reservation, there arises a contrary inference that the ‘United States
would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private
appropriator.’” In State of Arizona v. State of California, 373 U.S. 546,
596-602, 10 L. Ed. 2d 542, 83 S. Ct. 1468 (1963), the Supreme Court
again dealt with the question of water rights for Indian Reservations.
The relevant portion of the decision was in the context of litigation
concerning the interpretation and effect of comprehensive
Congressional action determining multiple state rights to the waters of
the Colorado River. However, the Indian Reservations had been created
many years before from arid land that required water to sustain human
life. The need for water was apparent at the time the Reservations were
created, and the inclusion of water rights was confirmed by
Congressional appropriations to finance and maintain irrigating
projects. Following the logic of Winters, the Supreme Court determined
that the creation of the Reservations carried with it the need for water
to sustain human life on those Reservations. The purpose for the
creation of Reservations was clear—to provide habitable land for the
Indian tribes. The necessity for water was obvious, as was the case in
Winters.92
In the Coeur d’Alene case, the Idaho Supreme Court reiterated the
distinctions between non-Indian federal reservations and Indian reservations and
went further in its analysis, holding that these distinctions were “advis[ing] against
application of New Mexico's primary-secondary purposes test.”93
B. The Inherent Purpose of an Indian Reservation
Federal Indian reservations exist to provide home for a group of people. The
fact that the reservation is intended as a homeland is therefore inconsistent with a
limited purpose. According to Professor Hedden-Nicely, speaking about the Coeur
92. Id. (internal citations omitted).
93. Dylan R. Hedden-Nicely, The Historical Evolution of the Methodology for Quantifying Federal
Reserved Instream Water Rights for American Indian Tribes, 50 ENVTL. L. 205, 253 (2020).
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d’Alene case, it was very important for the tribe that it continues to protect the
rights that their ancestors reserved.94 The tribe truly believes that the ancestors
were trying to set aside a permanent homeland for their people forever.95
Although the court found each of these distinctions important, it
ultimately concluded that “more to the point, the primary-secondary
distinction runs counter to the concept that the purpose of many Indian
reservations was to establish a ‘home and abiding place’ for the tribes.”
Accordingly, it concluded that the “purposes behind the creation of an
Indian reservation should be more broadly construed and not limited
solely to what may be considered a primary purpose.” Instead, the
court found that “Indian reservations were created to be a homeland
for the tribe and such a homeland would necessarily encompass uses
for water related to the tribe's ability to inhabit and live on the land.” It
once again surveyed the caselaw96, noting that Winters itself outlined a
homeland purpose for the creation of the Fort Belknap Reservation,
finding “in Winters, the Supreme Court lent support to the idea that the
reservation at issue was established as a ‘home and abiding place’ of
the Indians.”97
If the Idaho Supreme Court and the Arizona Supreme Court arrive at the same
conclusion, their reasoning is somewhat different.98 In Gila, the Arizona Supreme
Court held that “the essential purpose of Indian reservations is to provide Native
American people with a ‘permanent home and abiding place,’ that is, a ‘livable
environment.’”99 While the Arizona Supreme Court rules that, as a matter of law,
all Indian reservations have an inherent homeland purpose, the Idaho Supreme

94. Interview during Water Law II class with Dylan Hedden-Nicely, Professor, University of Idaho
College of Law, in Moscow, Idaho (Mar 24, 2020).
95. Id.
96. Hedden-Nicely, supra note 93, at 253–54 (emphasis added); Interview during Water Law II
class with Dylan Hedden-Nicely, Professor, University of Idaho College of Law, in Moscow, Idaho (Mar
24, 2020), (quoting Arizona I, 373 U.S. 546, 599 (1963)) (“The Supreme Court elaborated further that the
implied reservation of water on Indian Reservations requires enough water “to make the reservation
livable.’”); State ex rel. Greely v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 712
P.2d at 768 (“The purposes of Indian reserved rights, on the other hand, are given broader interpretation
in order to further the federal goal of Indian self-sufficiency.”); In re Gen. Adjudication of All Rights to
Use Water in the Gila River Sys. & Source, 35 P.3d 68, 74 (Ariz. 2001). The Arizona Supreme Court
adopted the homeland purpose theory when it stated that it “agreed with the [U.S.] Supreme Court that
the essential purpose of Indian reservations is to provide Native American people with a "permanent
home and abiding place,’ that is, a “livable environment.’” Id. (first quoting Winters, 207 U.S. 564, 565
(1908), then quoting Arizona I, 373 U.S. at 599)”).
97. Hedden-Nicely, supra note 93, at 253–54.
98. Hedden-Nicely, supra note 93, at 254 n.467.
99. Hedden-Nicely, supra note 93, at 254 n.468.
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Court holds that “[f]ormative documents and historical circumstances should be
used to derive the Reservation's purposes.”100
VI. CONCLUSION
While some states, such as Montana, Arizona and now Idaho, are more open
to a homeland purpose, other states, such as Wyoming, still reject the homeland
standard.
Even among the states of Arizona and Idaho, there is still no consensus
concerning the homeland purpose itself. Should it be an inherent purpose of all
Indian reservations, or should the courts examine the formative documents and
historical circumstances surrounding the creation of the reservation first to
determine whether or not there is a homeland purpose?
If the Idaho Supreme Court decision is a step in the right direction, there is still
a lot of unknown.
Right now, hundreds of tribes in the United States are confronted to divergent
views of the state courts. Only a future ruling by the United States Supreme Court
would be able to resolve this issue.

100. In re CSRBA Case No. 49576 Sub Case No. 91-7755, 448 P.3d 322, 347, 165 Idaho 517, 542
(2019).

